Daily Papers

Memes, combining text and images, frequently use metaphors to convey persuasive messages, shaping public opinion. Motivated by this, our team engaged in SemEval-2024 Task 4, a hierarchical multi-label classification task designed to identify rhetorical and psychological persuasion techniques embedded within memes. To tackle this problem, we introduced a caption generation step to assess the modality gap and the impact of additional semantic information from images, which improved our result. Our best model utilizes GPT-4 generated captions alongside meme text to fine-tune RoBERTa as the text encoder and CLIP as the image encoder. It outperforms the baseline by a large margin in all 12 subtasks. In particular, it ranked in top-3 across all languages in Subtask 2a, and top-4 in Subtask 2b, demonstrating quantitatively strong performance. The improvement achieved by the introduced intermediate step is likely attributable to the metaphorical essence of images that challenges visual encoders. This highlights the potential for improving abstract visual semantics encoding.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Visual metaphor generation is a challenging task that aims to generate an image given an input text metaphor. Inherently, it needs language understanding to bind a source concept with a target concept, in a way that preserves meaning while ensuring visual coherence. We propose a self-evaluating visual metaphor generation framework that focuses on metaphor alignment. Our self-evaluation approach combines existing metrics with our newly proposed metaphor decomposition score and a meaning alignment (MA) metric. Within this setup, we explore two novel approaches: a training-free pipeline that explicitly decomposes prompts into source-target-meaning (S-T-M) mapping for image synthesis, and a complementary training-based pipeline that improves alignment using our proposed self-evaluation reward schema, without any large-scale retraining. On the held-out test set, the training-free approach surpasses strong closed baselines (GPT-4o, Imagen) on decomposition, CLIP, and MA scores, with the training-based approach close behind. We evaluate our framework output using a user-facing study, and observed that participants preferred GPT-4o overall, while our training-free pipeline led open-source methods and edged Imagen on abstract metaphors. Our analyses show S-T-M prompting helps longer or more abstract metaphors, with closed models excelling on short, concrete cases; we also observe sensitivity to sampler settings. Overall, structured prompting and lightweight RL perform metaphor alignment well under modest compute, and remaining gaps to human preference appear driven by aesthetics and sampling.

A visual metaphor constitutes a high-order form of human creativity, employing cross-domain semantic fusion to transform abstract concepts into impactful visual rhetoric. Despite the remarkable progress of generative AI, existing models remain largely confined to pixel-level instruction alignment and surface-level appearance preservation, failing to capture the underlying abstract logic necessary for genuine metaphorical generation. To bridge this gap, we introduce the task of Visual Metaphor Transfer (VMT), which challenges models to autonomously decouple the "creative essence" from a reference image and re-materialize that abstract logic onto a user-specified target subject. We propose a cognitive-inspired, multi-agent framework that operationalizes Conceptual Blending Theory (CBT) through a novel Schema Grammar ("G"). This structured representation decouples relational invariants from specific visual entities, providing a rigorous foundation for cross-domain logic re-instantiation. Our pipeline executes VMT through a collaborative system of specialized agents: a perception agent that distills the reference into a schema, a transfer agent that maintains generic space invariance to discover apt carriers, a generation agent for high-fidelity synthesis and a hierarchical diagnostic agent that mimics a professional critic, performing closed-loop backtracking to identify and rectify errors across abstract logic, component selection, and prompt encoding. Extensive experiments and human evaluations demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms SOTA baselines in metaphor consistency, analogy appropriateness, and visual creativity, paving the way for automated high-impact creative applications in advertising and media. Source code will be made publicly available.

Idiomatic expressions have always been a bottleneck for language comprehension and natural language understanding, specifically for tasks like Machine Translation(MT). MT systems predominantly produce literal translations of idiomatic expressions as they do not exhibit generic and linguistically deterministic patterns which can be exploited for comprehension of the non-compositional meaning of the expressions. These expressions occur in parallel corpora used for training, but due to the comparatively high occurrences of the constituent words of idiomatic expressions in literal context, the idiomatic meaning gets overpowered by the compositional meaning of the expression. State of the art Metaphor Detection Systems are able to detect non-compositional usage at word level but miss out on idiosyncratic phrasal idiomatic expressions. This creates a dire need for a dataset with a wider coverage and higher occurrence of commonly occurring idiomatic expressions, the spans of which can be used for Metaphor Detection. With this in mind, we present our English Possible Idiomatic Expressions(EPIE) corpus containing 25206 sentences labelled with lexical instances of 717 idiomatic expressions. These spans also cover literal usages for the given set of idiomatic expressions. We also present the utility of our dataset by using it to train a sequence labelling module and testing on three independent datasets with high accuracy, precision and recall scores.

Karl Marx once wrote that ``the human essence is the ensemble of social relations'', suggesting that individuals are not isolated entities but are fundamentally shaped by their interactions with other entities, within which contexts play a constitutive and essential role. With the advent of computers and artificial intelligence, these contexts are no longer limited to purely human--human interactions: human--machine interactions are included as well. Then a central question emerges: How can machines better understand our situations and purposes? To address this challenge, researchers have recently introduced the concept of context engineering. Although it is often regarded as a recent innovation of the agent era, we argue that related practices can be traced back more than twenty years. Since the early 1990s, the field has evolved through distinct historical phases, each shaped by the intelligence level of machines: from early human--computer interaction frameworks built around primitive computers, to today's human--agent interaction paradigms driven by intelligent agents, and potentially to human--level or superhuman intelligence in the future. In this paper, we situate context engineering, provide a systematic definition, outline its historical and conceptual landscape, and examine key design considerations for practice. By addressing these questions, we aim to offer a conceptual foundation for context engineering and sketch its promising future. This paper is a stepping stone for a broader community effort toward systematic context engineering in AI systems.

Human languages are full of metaphorical expressions. Metaphors help people understand the world by connecting new concepts and domains to more familiar ones. Large pre-trained language models (PLMs) are therefore assumed to encode metaphorical knowledge useful for NLP systems. In this paper, we investigate this hypothesis for PLMs, by probing metaphoricity information in their encodings, and by measuring the cross-lingual and cross-dataset generalization of this information. We present studies in multiple metaphor detection datasets and in four languages (i.e., English, Spanish, Russian, and Farsi). Our extensive experiments suggest that contextual representations in PLMs do encode metaphorical knowledge, and mostly in their middle layers. The knowledge is transferable between languages and datasets, especially when the annotation is consistent across training and testing sets. Our findings give helpful insights for both cognitive and NLP scientists.

Large Vision-Language models (VLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning capabilities in tasks requiring a fine-grained understanding of literal images and text, such as visual question-answering or visual entailment. However, there has been little exploration of these models' capabilities when presented with images and captions containing figurative phenomena such as metaphors or humor, the meaning of which is often implicit. To close this gap, we propose a new task and a high-quality dataset: Visual Figurative Language Understanding with Textual Explanations (V-FLUTE). We frame the visual figurative language understanding problem as an explainable visual entailment task, where the model has to predict whether the image (premise) entails a claim (hypothesis) and justify the predicted label with a textual explanation. Using a human-AI collaboration framework, we build a high-quality dataset, V-FLUTE, that contains 6,027 <image, claim, label, explanation> instances spanning five diverse multimodal figurative phenomena: metaphors, similes, idioms, sarcasm, and humor. The figurative phenomena can be present either in the image, the caption, or both. We further conduct both automatic and human evaluations to assess current VLMs' capabilities in understanding figurative phenomena.

There is a large volume of late antique and medieval Hebrew texts. They represent a crucial linguistic and cultural bridge between Biblical and modern Hebrew. Poetry is prominent in these texts and one of its main haracteristics is the frequent use of metaphor. Distinguishing figurative and literal language use is a major task for scholars of the Humanities, especially in the fields of literature, linguistics, and hermeneutics. This paper presents a new, challenging dataset of late antique and medieval Hebrew poetry with expert annotations of metaphor, as well as some baseline results, which we hope will facilitate further research in this area.

Metaphorical comprehension in images remains a critical challenge for AI systems, as existing models struggle to grasp the nuanced cultural, emotional, and contextual implications embedded in visual content. While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) excel in basic Visual Question Answer (VQA) tasks, they struggle with a fundamental limitation on image implication tasks: contextual gaps that obscure the relationships between different visual elements and their abstract meanings. Inspired by the human cognitive process, we propose Let Androids Dream (LAD), a novel framework for image implication understanding and reasoning. LAD addresses contextual missing through the three-stage framework: (1) Perception: converting visual information into rich and multi-level textual representations, (2) Search: iteratively searching and integrating cross-domain knowledge to resolve ambiguity, and (3) Reasoning: generating context-alignment image implication via explicit reasoning. Our framework with the lightweight GPT-4o-mini model achieves SOTA performance compared to 15+ MLLMs on English image implication benchmark and a huge improvement on Chinese benchmark, performing comparable with the GPT-4o model on Multiple-Choice Question (MCQ) and outperforms 36.7% on Open-Style Question (OSQ). Additionally, our work provides new insights into how AI can more effectively interpret image implications, advancing the field of vision-language reasoning and human-AI interaction. Our project is publicly available at https://github.com/MING-ZCH/Let-Androids-Dream-of-Electric-Sheep.

Text-to-image (T2I) models have achieved remarkable success at faithfully rendering specified objects and attributes, yet their ability to produce visual metaphors, images that convey abstract ideas by combining elements from two distinct domains, remains largely unexamined. To bridge this gap, we introduce VMetaphor-Bench, the first benchmark for evaluating visual metaphor generation in T2I models. It comprises 1,500 visual metaphors curated from real-world creative imagery, organized into three levels and ten categories, with each sample paired with two prompts of differing specificity. For evaluation, we develop a hybrid framework within an MLLM-as-judge paradigm, combining a multiple-choice question (MCQ) based protocol of 9,594 questions across four levels of metaphorical fidelity with a dimension-based scoring protocol along three perceptual dimensions. Extensive evaluation of 11 representative T2I models reveals that even the strongest proprietary models struggle with compositional structuring and cross-domain mapping, key aspects of metaphorical expression, highlighting visual metaphor generation as an important frontier for future T2I research.

Visual metaphors are powerful rhetorical devices used to persuade or communicate creative ideas through images. Similar to linguistic metaphors, they convey meaning implicitly through symbolism and juxtaposition of the symbols. We propose a new task of generating visual metaphors from linguistic metaphors. This is a challenging task for diffusion-based text-to-image models, such as DALLcdotE 2, since it requires the ability to model implicit meaning and compositionality. We propose to solve the task through the collaboration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and Diffusion Models: Instruct GPT-3 (davinci-002) with Chain-of-Thought prompting generates text that represents a visual elaboration of the linguistic metaphor containing the implicit meaning and relevant objects, which is then used as input to the diffusion-based text-to-image models.Using a human-AI collaboration framework, where humans interact both with the LLM and the top-performing diffusion model, we create a high-quality dataset containing 6,476 visual metaphors for 1,540 linguistic metaphors and their associated visual elaborations. Evaluation by professional illustrators shows the promise of LLM-Diffusion Model collaboration for this task . To evaluate the utility of our Human-AI collaboration framework and the quality of our dataset, we perform both an intrinsic human-based evaluation and an extrinsic evaluation using visual entailment as a downstream task.

Image Schemas are repetitive cognitive patterns that influence the way we conceptualize and reason about various concepts present in speech. These patterns are deeply embedded within our cognitive processes and are reflected in our bodily expressions including gestures. Particularly, metaphoric gestures possess essential characteristics and semantic meanings that align with Image Schemas, to visually represent abstract concepts. The shape and form of gestures can convey abstract concepts, such as extending the forearm and hand or tracing a line with hand movements to visually represent the image schema of PATH. Previous behavior generation models have primarily focused on utilizing speech (acoustic features and text) to drive the generation model of virtual agents. They have not considered key semantic information as those carried by Image Schemas to effectively generate metaphoric gestures. To address this limitation, we introduce META4, a deep learning approach that generates metaphoric gestures from both speech and Image Schemas. Our approach has two primary goals: computing Image Schemas from input text to capture the underlying semantic and metaphorical meaning, and generating metaphoric gestures driven by speech and the computed image schemas. Our approach is the first method for generating speech driven metaphoric gestures while leveraging the potential of Image Schemas. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach and highlight the importance of both speech and image schemas in modeling metaphoric gestures.

Over the past decade, analogies, in the form of word-level analogies, have played a significant role as an intrinsic measure of evaluating the quality of word embedding methods such as word2vec. Modern large language models (LLMs), however, are primarily evaluated on extrinsic measures based on benchmarks such as GLUE and SuperGLUE, and there are only a few investigations on whether LLMs can draw analogies between long texts. In this paper, we present ANALOGICAL, a new benchmark to intrinsically evaluate LLMs across a taxonomy of analogies of long text with six levels of complexity -- (i) word, (ii) word vs. sentence, (iii) syntactic, (iv) negation, (v) entailment, and (vi) metaphor. Using thirteen datasets and three different distance measures, we evaluate the abilities of eight LLMs in identifying analogical pairs in the semantic vector space. Our evaluation finds that it is increasingly challenging for LLMs to identify analogies when going up the analogy taxonomy.

Figurative language (e.g., "he flew like the wind") is challenging to understand, as it is hard to tell what implicit information is being conveyed from the surface form alone. We hypothesize that to perform this task well, the reader needs to mentally elaborate the scene being described to identify a sensible meaning of the language. We present DREAM-FLUTE, a figurative language understanding system that does this, first forming a "mental model" of situations described in a premise and hypothesis before making an entailment/contradiction decision and generating an explanation. DREAM-FLUTE uses an existing scene elaboration model, DREAM, for constructing its "mental model." In the FigLang2022 Shared Task evaluation, DREAM-FLUTE achieved (joint) first place (Acc@60=63.3%), and can perform even better with ensemble techniques, demonstrating the effectiveness of this approach. More generally, this work suggests that adding a reflective component to pretrained language models can improve their performance beyond standard fine-tuning (3.3% improvement in Acc@60).

Figurative language is ubiquitous in English. Yet, the vast majority of NLP research focuses on literal language. Existing text representations by design rely on compositionality, while figurative language is often non-compositional. In this paper, we study the interpretation of two non-compositional figurative languages (idioms and similes). We collected datasets of fictional narratives containing a figurative expression along with crowd-sourced plausible and implausible continuations relying on the correct interpretation of the expression. We then trained models to choose or generate the plausible continuation. Our experiments show that models based solely on pre-trained language models perform substantially worse than humans on these tasks. We additionally propose knowledge-enhanced models, adopting human strategies for interpreting figurative language types : inferring meaning from the context and relying on the constituent words' literal meanings. The knowledge-enhanced models improve the performance on both the discriminative and generative tasks, further bridging the gap from human performance.

Many believe that Large Language Models (LLMs) open the era of Artificial Intelligence (AI). Some see opportunities while others see dangers. Yet both proponents and opponents grasp AI through the imagery popularised by science fiction. Will the machine become sentient and rebel against its creators? Will we experience a paperclip apocalypse? Before answering such questions, we should first ask whether this mental imagery provides a good description of the phenomenon at hand. Understanding weather patterns through the moods of the gods only goes so far. The present paper instead advocates understanding LLMs and their connection to AI through the imagery of Jorge Luis Borges, a master of 20th century literature, forerunner of magical realism, and precursor to postmodern literature. This exercise leads to a new perspective that illuminates the relation between language modelling and artificial intelligence.

We present VIVID (Vietnamese Idioms for Validation and Interpretation Depth), the first systematic benchmark for evaluating culturally grounded figurative language understanding in Vietnamese. VIVID comprises 1,636 idioms and proverbs annotated with five complexity traits (literal expressions, pragmatic nuances, Sino-Vietnamese terms, uncommon vocabulary, folk knowledge) and seven semantic themes. We establish an evaluation framework combining generative and discriminative tasks, proposing an LLM-as-a-Judge approach with aspect-based prompting validated against human judgment (Cohen's kappa = 0.792). Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models reveals critical gaps: Vietnamese-specialized models drastically underperform multilingual systems (VinaLLaMA-7B: 0.13 vs. GPT-4o: 2.46), and even top models achieve less than 50% of maximum scores. Notably, few-shot prompting does not universally improve performance, with GPT-4o exhibiting degradation due to stylistic overfitting. Our analysis exposes systematic failures including literal over-interpretation, lexical gaps, and pragmatic flattening, demonstrating that current models lack cultural competence for nuanced figurative interpretation. VIVID provides an essential tool for advancing figurative language understanding in culturally rich contexts.

In this manifesto, we put forward the idea of data alchemy as a narrative device to discuss storytelling and transdisciplinarity in visualization. If data is the prima materia of modern science, how does one perform the Great Work? We use text-to-image diffusion-based generative art to develop the concept, and structure our argument in ten propositions, as if they were ten issues of a comic novel on data alchemy: Ad Disco Diffusionem. To follow the argument, the reader must immerse themselves in our miro board, and navigate a multimedia semiotic topology that includes comics, videos, code demos, and ergotic literature in a true alchemic sense. By accessing this paradigm one might find new sources of inspiration for scientific inquiry in familiar places, or get lost in the creative exploration of the unknown. Our colorful, sometimes poetic, exposition should not distract the reader from the seriousness of the ideas discussed, but ultimately it is about the journey.

Metaphorical comprehension in images remains a critical challenge for Nowadays AI systems. While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) excel at basic Visual Question Answering (VQA), they consistently struggle to grasp the nuanced cultural, emotional, and contextual implications embedded in visual content. This difficulty stems from the task's demand for sophisticated multi-hop reasoning, cultural context, and Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities, which current models lack. To fill this gap, we propose MetaphorStar, the first end-to-end visual reinforcement learning (RL) framework for image implication tasks. Our framework includes three core components: the fine-grained dataset TFQ-Data, the visual RL method TFQ-GRPO, and the well-structured benchmark TFQ-Bench. Our fully open-source MetaphorStar family, trained using TFQ-GRPO on TFQ-Data, significantly improves performance by an average of 82.6% on the image implication benchmarks. Compared with 20+ mainstream MLLMs, MetaphorStar-32B achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) on Multiple-Choice Question and Open-Style Question, significantly outperforms the top closed-source model Gemini-3.0-pro on True-False Question. Crucially, our experiments reveal that learning image implication tasks improves the general understanding ability, especially the complex visual reasoning ability. We further provide a systematic analysis of model parameter scaling, training data scaling, and the impact of different model architectures and training strategies, demonstrating the broad applicability of our method. We open-sourced all model weights, datasets, and method code at https://metaphorstar.github.io.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

This paper presents a comprehensive evaluation of the capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) in metaphor interpretation across multiple datasets, tasks, and prompt configurations. Although metaphor processing has gained significant attention in Natural Language Processing (NLP), previous research has been limited to single-dataset evaluations and specific task settings, often using artificially constructed data through lexical replacement. We address these limitations by conducting extensive experiments using diverse publicly available datasets with inference and metaphor annotations, focusing on Natural Language Inference (NLI) and Question Answering (QA) tasks. The results indicate that LLMs' performance is more influenced by features like lexical overlap and sentence length than by metaphorical content, demonstrating that any alleged emergent abilities of LLMs to understand metaphorical language are the result of a combination of surface-level features, in-context learning, and linguistic knowledge. This work provides critical insights into the current capabilities and limitations of LLMs in processing figurative language, highlighting the need for more realistic evaluation frameworks in metaphor interpretation tasks. Data and code are publicly available.

LLMs can generate fluent prose. Story quality depends on how decisions about plot, character, and language work together across planning, drafting, and revision. Guiding these decisions presents two bottlenecks: the quality of story guidance and its sustained use. We formulate Vibe Narrativizing as the task of turning natural-language writing requirements into a finished story and present MUSE, a Theory-Harnessed Story Engine. MUSE organizes story knowledge as guidance for specific decisions and carries those decisions into subsequent creative work. Knowledge engineering develops Robert McKee's story theory through rule atomization, semantic consolidation, and mechanism abstraction; a single source of truth and layered disclosure organize the resulting guidance. Typical examples complement principles that depend on context and aesthetic judgment. An agent harness organizes design, character performance, scene composition, and revision through intermediate deliverables that preserve story decisions. Context engineering supplies each role with the relevant guidance and decisions, while a masterwork corpus provides inspiration and prose references. A worked example follows one requested object from its thematic role to the characters' climactic actions. Across four base models, MUSE improves WritingBench by 1.6-4.8 points over zero-shot generation and raises LongStoryEval by more than ten points on three. ConStory-Bench consistency error density remains in the low single digits for all four models, below every reproduced story-system baseline on three. Component ablations locate the largest quality contribution in structural design, voice-specific effects in the character path, and further gains in revision. Code is available at https://github.com/RoadtoAGI/MUSE.

This paper explores the intersection of identity, individuality, and reality through competing frameworks, including classical metaphysics, quantum mechanics, and computational theories. Traditional metaphysical notions of fixed identity are challenged by advancements in cloning, teletransportation, and digital replication, which reveal the fluid and relational nature of individuality. Quantum mechanics further complicates these notions, emphasizing the indistinguishability and contextuality of fundamental particles. Computational approaches, such as the Ruliad and Constructor Theory, offer expansive views of emergent realities but often lack practical constraints for observer relevance. Algorithmic idealism is introduced as a unifying framework, proposing that reality is an emergent construct governed by computational rules prioritizing coherence, sufficiency, and observer-dependent experiences. By redefining identity as an informational construct and reality as a process shaped by algorithmic transitions, algorithmic idealism resolves foundational paradoxes and offers a superior lens for understanding existence in an increasingly digital and interconnected world. The framework bridges gaps between competing theories, providing a coherent and pragmatic model for addressing ethical, metaphysical, and technological challenges.

Metaphors, although occasionally unperceived, are ubiquitous in our everyday language. Thus, it is crucial for Language Models to be able to grasp the underlying meaning of this kind of figurative language. In this work, we present Meta4XNLI, a novel parallel dataset for the tasks of metaphor detection and interpretation that contains metaphor annotations in both Spanish and English. We investigate language models' metaphor identification and understanding abilities through a series of monolingual and cross-lingual experiments by leveraging our proposed corpus. In order to comprehend how these non-literal expressions affect models' performance, we look over the results and perform an error analysis. Additionally, parallel data offers many potential opportunities to investigate metaphor transferability between these languages and the impact of translation on the development of multilingual annotated resources.

The ability to process idiomatic or literal multiword expressions is a crucial aspect of understanding and generating any language. The task of generating contextually relevant continuations for narratives containing idiomatic (or literal) expressions can allow us to test the ability of generative language models (LMs) in understanding nuanced language containing non-compositional figurative text. We conduct a series of experiments using datasets in two distinct languages (English and Portuguese) under three different training settings (zero-shot, few-shot, and fine-tuned). Our results suggest that the models are only slightly better at generating continuations for literal contexts than idiomatic contexts, with exceedingly small margins. Furthermore, the models studied in this work perform equally well across both languages, indicating the robustness of generative models in performing this task.

We present a comprehensive evaluation of the ability of large language models (LLMs) to process culturally grounded language, specifically to understand and pragmatically use figurative expressions that encode local knowledge and cultural nuance. Using figurative language as a proxy for cultural nuance and local knowledge, we design evaluation tasks for contextual understanding, pragmatic use, and connotation interpretation in Arabic and English. We evaluate 22 open- and closed-source LLMs on Egyptian Arabic idioms, multidialectal Arabic proverbs, and English proverbs. Our results show a consistent hierarchy: the average accuracy for Arabic proverbs is 4.29% lower than for English proverbs, and performance for Egyptian idioms is 10.28% lower than for Arabic proverbs. For the pragmatic use task, accuracy drops by 14.07% relative to understanding, though providing contextual idiomatic sentences improves accuracy by 10.66%. Models also struggle with connotative meaning, reaching at most 85.58% agreement with human annotators on idioms with 100% inter-annotator agreement. These findings demonstrate that figurative language serves as an effective diagnostic for cultural reasoning: while LLMs can often interpret figurative meaning, they face challenges in using it appropriately. To support future research, we release Kinayat, the first dataset of Egyptian Arabic idioms designed for both figurative understanding and pragmatic use evaluation.

We propose a novel application of prompting Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to generate analogies and study how to design effective prompts for two task settings: generating a source concept analogous to a given target concept (aka Analogous Concept Generation or ACG), and generating an explanation of the similarity between a given pair of target concept and source concept (aka Analogous Explanation Generation or AEG). We found that it is feasible to prompt InstructGPT to generate meaningful analogies and the best prompts tend to be precise imperative statements especially with a low temperature setting. We also systematically analyzed the sensitivity of the InstructGPT model to prompt design, temperature, and injected spelling errors, and found that the model is particularly sensitive to certain variations (e.g., questions vs. imperative statements). Further, we conducted human evaluation on 1.4k of the generated analogies and found that the quality of generations varies substantially by model size. The largest InstructGPT model can achieve human-level performance at generating meaningful analogies for a given target while there is still room for improvement on the AEG task.

As a type of figurative language, an East Asian idiom condenses rich cultural background into only a few characters. Translating such idioms is challenging for human translators, who often resort to choosing a context-aware translation from an existing list of candidates. However, compiling a dictionary of candidate translations demands much time and creativity even for expert translators. To alleviate such burden, we evaluate if GPT-4 can help generate high-quality translations. Based on automatic evaluations of faithfulness and creativity, we first identify Pareto-optimal prompting strategies that can outperform translation engines from Google and DeepL. Then, at a low cost, our context-aware translations can achieve far more high-quality translations per idiom than the human baseline. We open-source all code and data to facilitate further research.

Figures of speech such as metaphors, similes, and idioms allow language to be expressive, invoke emotion, and communicate abstract ideas that might otherwise be difficult to visualize. These figurative forms are often conveyed through multiple modes, such as text and images, and frequently appear in advertising, news, social media, etc. Understanding multimodal figurative language is an essential component of human communication, and it plays a significant role in our daily interactions. While humans can intuitively understand multimodal figurative language, this poses a challenging task for machines that requires the cognitive ability to map between domains, abstraction, commonsense, and profound language and cultural knowledge. In this work, we propose the Image Recognition of Figurative Language dataset to examine vision and language models' understanding of figurative language. We leverage human annotation and an automatic pipeline we created to generate a multimodal dataset and introduce two novel tasks as a benchmark for multimodal figurative understanding. We experiment with several baseline models and find that all perform substantially worse than humans. We hope our dataset and benchmark will drive the development of models that will better understand figurative language.

Analogical reasoning -- the capacity to identify and map structural relationships between different domains -- is fundamental to human cognition and learning. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) can sometimes match humans in analogical reasoning tasks, opening the possibility that analogical reasoning might emerge from domain-general processes. However, it is still debated whether these emergent capacities are largely superficial and limited to simple relations seen during training or whether they encompass the flexible representational and mapping capabilities which are the focus of leading cognitive models of analogy. In this study, we introduce novel analogical reasoning tasks that require participants to map between semantically contentful words and sequences of letters and other abstract characters. This task necessitates the ability to flexibly re-represent rich semantic information -- an ability which is known to be central to human analogy but which is thus far not well captured by existing cognitive theories and models. We assess the performance of both human participants and LLMs on tasks focusing on reasoning from semantic structure and semantic content, introducing variations that test the robustness of their analogical inferences. Advanced LLMs match human performance across several conditions, though humans and LLMs respond differently to certain task variations and semantic distractors. Our results thus provide new evidence that LLMs might offer a how-possibly explanation of human analogical reasoning in contexts that are not yet well modeled by existing theories, but that even today's best models are unlikely to yield how-actually explanations.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Abstract concepts - justice, theory, availability - have no single perceivable referent; in the human brain, their meaning emerges from a web of experiences, affect, and social context. Do large language models (LLMs) ground abstract concepts in a similar way? We study this by replicating property-generation experiments from cognitive science on 21 frontier and open-weight LLMs. Across models and experiments, we find a consistent pattern: when compared to humans, models rely too heavily on word associations, and underproduce properties tied to emotion and internal states. This yields a large and consistent grounding gap: no model exceeds a Pearson correlation r=0.37 with human responses, compared to a human-to-human ceiling above r=0.9. To better interpret this gap, we also replicate a rating experiment on grounding categories and find that here LLMs align more closely with human judgment, and alignment improves as models get larger. We then use sparse autoencoders (SAEs) to inspect whether this information is also reflected in the models' internal features, and we do identify features connected to grounding dimensions such as "sensorimotor" and "social". These findings suggest that current LLMs can recover grounding dimensions when explicitly queried, but do not recruit them in a human-like way when words are generated freely.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Linguistic commentary on LLMs, heavily influenced by the theoretical frameworks of de Saussure and Chomsky, is often speculative and unproductive. Critics challenge whether LLMs can legitimately model language, citing the need for "deep structure" or "grounding" to achieve an idealized linguistic "competence." We argue for a radical shift in perspective towards the empiricist principles of Witold Ma\'nczak, a prominent general and historical linguist. He defines language not as a "system of signs" or a "computational system of the brain" but as the totality of all that is said and written. Above all, he identifies frequency of use of particular language elements as language's primary governing principle. Using his framework, we challenge prior critiques of LLMs and provide a constructive guide for designing, evaluating, and interpreting language models.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

Meaning in human language is relational, context dependent, and emergent, arising from dynamic systems of signs rather than fixed word-concept mappings. In computational settings, this semiotic and interpretive complexity complicates the generation and evaluation of meaning. This article proposes an interdisciplinary framework for studying meaning in large language model (LLM) generated language by integrating semiotics and hermeneutics with qualitative research methods. We review prior scholarship on meaning and machines, examining how linguistic signs are transformed into vectorized representations in static and contextualized embedding models, and identify gaps between statistical approximation and human interpretive meaning. We then introduce the Inductive Conceptual Rating (ICR) metric, a qualitative evaluation approach grounded in inductive content analysis and reflexive thematic analysis, designed to assess semantic accuracy and meaning alignment in LLM-outputs beyond lexical similarity metrics. We apply ICR in an empirical comparison of LLM generated and human generated thematic summaries across five datasets (N = 50 to 800). While LLMs achieve high linguistic similarity, they underperform on semantic accuracy, particularly in capturing contextually grounded meanings. Performance improves with larger datasets but remains variable across models, potentially reflecting differences in the frequency and coherence of recurring concepts and meanings. We conclude by arguing for evaluation frameworks that leverage systematic qualitative interpretation practices when assessing meaning in LLM-generated outputs from reference texts.

Figurative and non-literal expressions are profoundly integrated in human communication. Visualising such expressions allow us to convey our creative thoughts, and evoke nuanced emotions. Recent text-to-image models like Stable Diffusion, on the other hand, struggle to depict non-literal expressions. Recent works primarily deal with this issue by compiling humanly annotated datasets on a small scale, which not only demands specialised expertise but also proves highly inefficient. To address this issue, we introduce ViPE: Visualise Pretty-much Everything. ViPE offers a series of lightweight and robust language models that have been trained on a large-scale set of lyrics with noisy visual descriptions that represent their implicit meaning. The synthetic visual descriptions are generated by GPT3.5 relying on neither human annotations nor images. ViPE effectively expresses any arbitrary piece of text into a visualisable description, enabling meaningful and high-quality image generation. We provide compelling evidence that ViPE is more robust than GPT3.5 in synthesising visual elaborations. ViPE also exhibits an understanding of figurative expressions comparable to human experts, providing a powerful and open-source backbone to many downstream applications such as music video and caption generation.

Figures of speech, such as metaphor and irony, are ubiquitous in literature works and colloquial conversations. This poses great challenge for natural language understanding since figures of speech usually deviate from their ostensible meanings to express deeper semantic implications. Previous research lays emphasis on the literary aspect of figures and seldom provide a comprehensive exploration from a view of computational linguistics. In this paper, we first propose the concept of figurative unit, which is the carrier of a figure. Then we select 12 types of figures commonly used in Chinese, and build a Chinese corpus for Contextualized Figure Recognition (ConFiguRe). Different from previous token-level or sentence-level counterparts, ConFiguRe aims at extracting a figurative unit from discourse-level context, and classifying the figurative unit into the right figure type. On ConFiguRe, three tasks, i.e., figure extraction, figure type classification and figure recognition, are designed and the state-of-the-art techniques are utilized to implement the benchmarks. We conduct thorough experiments and show that all three tasks are challenging for existing models, thus requiring further research. Our dataset and code are publicly available at https://github.com/pku-tangent/ConFiguRe.

Static concreteness ratings are widely used in NLP, yet a word's concreteness can shift with context, especially in figurative language such as metaphor, where common concrete nouns can take abstract interpretations. While such shifts are evident from context, it remains unclear how LLMs understand concreteness internally. We conduct a layer-wise and geometric analysis of LLM hidden representations across four model families, examining how models distinguish literal vs figurative uses of the same noun and how concreteness is organized in representation space. We find that LLMs separate literal and figurative usage in early layers, and that mid-to-late layers compress concreteness into a one-dimensional direction that is consistent across models. Finally, we show that this geometric structure is practically useful: a single concreteness direction supports efficient figurative-language classification and enables training-free steering of generation toward more literal or more figurative rewrites.

Drawing on contemporary pragmatist philosophy and linguistic theories on cognition, meaning, and communication, this paper presents a dynamic, metasemantic-metapragmatic taxonomy for grounding and conceptualizing human-like multimodal communicative alignment. The framework is rooted in contemporary developments of the three basic communicative capacities initially identified by American logician and pragmatist philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce: iconic (sensory and perceptual qualities), indexical (contextual and sociocultural associations), and rule-like (symbolic and intuitive reasoning). Expanding on these developments, I introduce the concept of indexical contextualization and propose the principle of "contextualization directionality" for characterizing the crucial metapragmatic capacity for maintaining, navigating, or transitioning between semantic and pragmatic modes of multimodal communication. I contend that current cognitive-social computational and engineering methodologies disproportionately emphasize the semantic/metasemantic domain, overlooking the pivotal role of metapragmatic indexicality in traversing the semantic-pragmatic spectrum of communication. The framework's broader implications for intentionality, identity, affect, and ethics in within-modal and cross-modal human-machine alignment are also discussed.

Humans regularly engage in analogical thinking, relating personal experiences to current situations (X is analogous to Y because of Z). Analogical thinking allows humans to solve problems in creative ways, grasp difficult concepts, and articulate ideas more effectively. Can language models (LMs) do the same? To answer this question, we propose ANALOBENCH, a benchmark to determine analogical reasoning ability in LMs. Our benchmarking approach focuses on aspects of this ability that are common among humans: (i) recalling related experiences from a large amount of information, and (ii) applying analogical reasoning to complex and lengthy scenarios. We test a broad collection of proprietary models (e.g., GPT family, Claude V2) and open source models such as LLaMA2. As in prior results, scaling up LMs results in some performance boosts. Surprisingly, scale offers minimal gains when, (i) analogies involve lengthy scenarios, or (ii) recalling relevant scenarios from a large pool of information, a process analogous to finding a needle in a haystack. We hope these observations encourage further research in this field.

The ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to encode syntactic and semantic structures of language is well examined in NLP. Additionally, analogy identification, in the form of word analogies are extensively studied in the last decade of language modeling literature. In this work we specifically look at how LLMs' abilities to capture sentence analogies (sentences that convey analogous meaning to each other) vary with LLMs' abilities to encode syntactic and semantic structures of sentences. Through our analysis, we find that LLMs' ability to identify sentence analogies is positively correlated with their ability to encode syntactic and semantic structures of sentences. Specifically, we find that the LLMs which capture syntactic structures better, also have higher abilities in identifying sentence analogies.

As artificial intelligence (AI) improves, traditional alignment strategies may falter in the face of unpredictable self-improvement, hidden subgoals, and the sheer complexity of intelligent systems. Inspired by contemplative wisdom traditions, we show how four axiomatic principles can instil a resilient Wise World Model in AI systems. First, mindfulness enables self-monitoring and recalibration of emergent subgoals. Second, emptiness forestalls dogmatic goal fixation and relaxes rigid priors. Third, non-duality dissolves adversarial self-other boundaries. Fourth, boundless care motivates the universal reduction of suffering. We find that prompting AI to reflect on these principles improves performance on the AILuminate Benchmark (d=.96) and boosts cooperation and joint-reward on the Prisoner's Dilemma task (d=7+). We offer detailed implementation strategies at the level of architectures, constitutions, and reinforcement on chain-of-thought. For future systems, active inference may offer the self-organizing and dynamic coupling capabilities needed to enact Contemplative AI in embodied agents.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

Generative artificial intelligence (AI) systems based on large-scale pretrained foundation models (PFMs) such as vision-language models, large language models (LLMs), diffusion models and vision-language-action (VLA) models have demonstrated the ability to solve complex and truly non-trivial AI problems in a wide variety of domains and contexts. Multimodal large language models (MLLMs), in particular, learn from vast and diverse data sources, allowing rich and nuanced representations of the world and, thereby, providing extensive capabilities, including the ability to reason, engage in meaningful dialog; collaborate with humans and other agents to jointly solve complex problems; and understand social and emotional aspects of humans. Despite this impressive feat, the cognitive abilities of state-of-the-art LLMs trained on large-scale datasets are still superficial and brittle. Consequently, generic LLMs are severely limited in their generalist capabilities. A number of foundational problems -- embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory -- are required to be addressed for LLMs to attain human-level general intelligence. These concepts are more aligned with human cognition and provide LLMs with inherent human-like cognitive properties that support the realization of physically-plausible, semantically meaningful, flexible and more generalizable knowledge and intelligence. In this work, we discuss the aforementioned foundational issues and survey state-of-the art approaches for implementing these concepts in LLMs. Specifically, we discuss how the principles of embodiment, symbol grounding, causality and memory can be leveraged toward the attainment of artificial general intelligence (AGI) in an organic manner.

The question of AI consciousness is one of the most urgent pre-emptive problems in philosophy and computer science, yet progress is hampered by a cacophony of competing theories that often talk past each other. Separating the hard problem from the mapping problem allows the deepest metaphysical disagreements to be set aside: granting that experience supervenes on a system's organisation, the tractable question becomes at which grain of description that supervenience base sits. We extend Marr's three levels of analysis into a five-level hierarchy of functional descriptions (behavioural, computational, intrinsic causal-structural, organismic, and organism-environment) grounded in supervenience, coarse-graining, and multiple realisability. The major theories of consciousness are positioned within this hierarchy according to which level they take to be critical, and for each level we develop operationalisable indicators and assess current AI systems against them. A Bayesian model then combines theoretical credences with indicator evidence into an overall credence in a system's capacity for consciousness. In illustrative assessments, the verdict for current LLMs is driven as much by where theoretical credence is placed as by how the evidence is read: under different stipulated readings and credence distributions, assessments range from below 0.01 to roughly 0.8, showing sensitivity to assumptions. Finally, the consciousness indicators at each level closely overlap with the architectural features needed for general intelligence, suggesting that increasingly capable AI may become a stronger candidate for consciousness. The framework supports a structured agnosticism, in which theoretical commitments are made explicit, credences are updated as evidence accumulates, and assessments take the form of aggregated probabilities rather than verdicts.

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) have shown remarkable progress in visual generation. Yet, existing benchmarks predominantly assess Crystallized Intelligence, which relies on recalling accumulated knowledge and learned schemas. This focus overlooks Generative Fluid Intelligence (GFI): the capacity to induce patterns, reason through constraints, and adapt to novel scenarios on the fly. To rigorously assess this capability, we introduce GENIUS (GEN Fluid Intelligence EvalUation Suite). We formalize GFI as a synthesis of three primitives. These include Inducing Implicit Patterns (e.g., inferring personalized visual preferences), Executing Ad-hoc Constraints (e.g., visualizing abstract metaphors), and Adapting to Contextual Knowledge (e.g., simulating counter-intuitive physics). Collectively, these primitives challenge models to solve problems grounded entirely in the immediate context. Our systematic evaluation of 12 representative models reveals significant performance deficits in these tasks. Crucially, our diagnostic analysis disentangles these failure modes. It demonstrates that deficits stem from limited context comprehension rather than insufficient intrinsic generative capability. To bridge this gap, we propose a training-free attention intervention strategy. Ultimately, GENIUS establishes a rigorous standard for GFI, guiding the field beyond knowledge utilization toward dynamic, general-purpose reasoning. Our dataset and code will be released at: https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS{https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS}.

Formal and distributional semantic models offer complementary benefits in modeling meaning. The categorical compositional distributional (DisCoCat) model of meaning of Coecke et al. (arXiv:1003.4394v1 [cs.CL]) combines aspected of both to provide a general framework in which meanings of words, obtained distributionally, are composed using methods from the logical setting to form sentence meaning. Concrete consequences of this general abstract setting and applications to empirical data are under active study (Grefenstette et al., arxiv:1101.0309; Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh, arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]). . In this paper, we extend this study by examining transitive verbs, represented as matrices in a DisCoCat. We discuss three ways of constructing such matrices, and evaluate each method in a disambiguation task developed by Grefenstette and Sadrzadeh (arXiv:1106.4058v1 [cs.CL]).

Due to the self-referencing aspect, consciousness is placed in a unique non-computable position among natural phenomena. Non-computable consciousness was previously analyzed on the basis of self-referential cyclical time. This paper extends the cyclical model of vacuum observation and posits that choice, or the experience of reality, may be expressed as the initial part of the self-referencing loop, while the conscious awareness of the experience is the other part of the loop. In particular, the inseparability of the two sides of the loop is established through the cyclical time process, which bears a resemblance to Heidegger's analysis of existence. The cyclical looping model is also discussed in terms of Wittgenstein's analysis of language as attaching semantic meaning, or continuous or infinite conscious awareness, to physical reality. We also discuss the proposed model of subjectivity and cyclical time - as opposed to objectivity and linear time - which may be considered similar to Hebrew thought.

This paper presents a systematic defense of large language model (LLM) hallucinations or 'confabulations' as a potential resource instead of a categorically negative pitfall. The standard view is that confabulations are inherently problematic and AI research should eliminate this flaw. In this paper, we argue and empirically demonstrate that measurable semantic characteristics of LLM confabulations mirror a human propensity to utilize increased narrativity as a cognitive resource for sense-making and communication. In other words, it has potential value. Specifically, we analyze popular hallucination benchmarks and reveal that hallucinated outputs display increased levels of narrativity and semantic coherence relative to veridical outputs. This finding reveals a tension in our usually dismissive understandings of confabulation. It suggests, counter-intuitively, that the tendency for LLMs to confabulate may be intimately associated with a positive capacity for coherent narrative-text generation.

This paper proposes a novel framework for understanding large language models (LLMs) by reconceptualizing them as semiotic machines rather than as imitations of human cognition. Drawing from structuralist and post-structuralist theories of language-specifically the works of Ferdinand de Saussure and Jacques Derrida-I argue that LLMs should be understood as models of language itself, aligning with Derrida's concept of 'writing' (l'ecriture). The paper is structured into three parts. First, I lay the theoretical groundwork by explaining how the word2vec embedding algorithm operates within Saussure's framework of language as a relational system of signs. Second, I apply Derrida's critique of Saussure to position 'writing' as the object modeled by LLMs, offering a view of the machine's 'mind' as a statistical approximation of sign behavior. Finally, the third section addresses how modern LLMs reflect post-structuralist notions of unfixed meaning, arguing that the "next token generation" mechanism effectively captures the dynamic nature of meaning. By reconceptualizing LLMs as semiotic machines rather than cognitive models, this framework provides an alternative lens through which to assess the strengths and limitations of LLMs, offering new avenues for future research.

Minimal Phenomenal Experiences (MPEs) are states of consciousness in which wakefulness is preserved but phenomenal content is low or absent. The Entropic Brain Hypothesis (EBH) is a model of conscious processes that regards the entropy of spontaneous brain activity as a marker of 'phenomenal richness', exemplified by high-content psychedelic experiences (HCPEs). Yet recent human neuroimaging studies of MPEs induced by meditation -- and possibly 5-MeO-DMT -- suggest that these states, defined by their phenomenological simplicity, also show signs of increased neurophysiological entropy. This presents a conundrum for the EBH: brain entropy is elevated with increased and decreased richness of the phenomenal experience. Here, we put forward the Complex Brain Hypothesis (CBH), which proposes that the richness of experience differentiating MPEs from HCPEs is better indexed by complexity than by entropy. We argue that brain complexity is modulated by the grain of inference through which the brain resolves uncertainty: some HCPEs exemplify a fine-grained regime, in which loosened constraints amplify fluctuations into proliferating content, whereas some MPEs exemplify a coarse-grained regime, in which a simpler model dissolves variety into an experience of 'contentless' awareness. Both regimes can be associated with elevated brain entropy, but they diverge in phenomenology and perturbational signatures. By resolving the entropy-content conundrum, the CBH refines the EBH and highlights MPEs as an important test case for computational theories of consciousness.

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

Any new medium, once it emerges, is used for more than the transmission of overt content alone. The information it carries typically operates on two levels: one is the content directly presented, while the other is the subtext beneath it-the implicit ideas and intentions the creator seeks to convey through the medium. Likewise, since video technologies became widely adopted, video has served not only as a powerful tool for recording and communicating visual information, but also as a vehicle for emotions, attitudes, and social meanings that are often difficult to articulate explicitly. Thus, the true meaning of many videos does not reside solely in what is shown on screen; it is often embedded in context, style of expression, and the viewer's social experience. Some forms of such video subtext are humorous, while others carry irony, mockery, or criticism. These implicit meanings can also be interpreted very differently across cultural backgrounds and social groups. However, most existing video understanding models still focus primarily on literal visual comprehension, such as recognizing objects, actions, or temporal relations, and lack a systematic ability to understand the metaphorical, ironic, and social meanings embedded in videos. To bridge this gap, we introduce ViMU, the first benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the subtext understanding capabilities of frontier models in videos. ViMU assesses whether video understanding models can go beyond literal perception to infer implicit meaning while grounding their interpretations in multimodal evidence and answering both open-ended and multiple-choice questions. Importantly, all questions are designed to be hint-free, ensuring that no key evidence is disclosed to models before answering.

Consciousness stands as one of the most profound and distinguishing features of the human mind, fundamentally shaping our understanding of existence and agency. As large language models (LLMs) develop at an unprecedented pace, questions concerning intelligence and consciousness have become increasingly significant. However, discourse on LLM consciousness remains largely unexplored territory. In this paper, we first clarify frequently conflated terminologies (e.g., LLM consciousness and LLM awareness). Then, we systematically organize and synthesize existing research on LLM consciousness from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Furthermore, we highlight potential frontier risks that conscious LLMs might introduce. Finally, we discuss current challenges and outline future directions in this emerging field. The references discussed in this paper are organized at https://github.com/OpenCausaLab/Awesome-LLM-Consciousness.

The symbolic architecture of non-ordinary consciousness remains largely unmapped in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. While conventional models prioritize rational coherence, altered states such as those induced by psychedelics reveal distinct symbolic regimes characterized by recursive metaphor, ego dissolution, and semantic destabilization. We present Glyph, a generative symbolic interface designed to simulate psilocybin-like symbolic cognition in large language models. Rather than modeling perception or mood, Glyph enacts symbolic transformation through recursive reentry, metaphoric modulation, and entropy-scaled destabilization -- a triadic operator formalized within a tensorial linguistic framework. Experimental comparison with baseline GPT-4o reveals that Glyph consistently generates high-entropy, metaphor-saturated, and ego-dissolving language across diverse symbolic prompt categories. These results validate the emergence of non-ordinary cognitive patterns and support a new paradigm for simulating altered consciousness through language. Glyph opens novel pathways for modeling symbolic cognition, exploring metaphor theory, and encoding knowledge in recursively altered semantic spaces.

Probabilistic models of language understanding are valuable tools for investigating human language use. However, they need to be hand-designed for a particular domain. In contrast, large language models (LLMs) are trained on text that spans a wide array of domains, but they lack the structure and interpretability of probabilistic models. In this paper, we use chain-of-thought prompts to introduce structures from probabilistic models into LLMs. We explore this approach in the case of metaphor understanding. Our chain-of-thought prompts lead language models to infer latent variables and reason about their relationships in order to choose appropriate paraphrases for metaphors. The latent variables and relationships chosen are informed by theories of metaphor understanding from cognitive psychology. We apply these prompts to the two largest versions of GPT-3 and show that they can improve performance in a paraphrase selection task.

Machines have achieved a broad and growing set of linguistic competencies, thanks to recent progress in Natural Language Processing (NLP). Psychologists have shown increasing interest in such models, comparing their output to psychological judgments such as similarity, association, priming, and comprehension, raising the question of whether the models could serve as psychological theories. In this article, we compare how humans and machines represent the meaning of words. We argue that contemporary NLP systems are fairly successful models of human word similarity, but they fall short in many other respects. Current models are too strongly linked to the text-based patterns in large corpora, and too weakly linked to the desires, goals, and beliefs that people express through words. Word meanings must also be grounded in perception and action and be capable of flexible combinations in ways that current systems are not. We discuss more promising approaches to grounding NLP systems and argue that they will be more successful with a more human-like, conceptual basis for word meaning.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated notable creative abilities in generating literary texts, including poetry and short stories. However, prior research has primarily centered on English, with limited exploration of non-English literary traditions and without standardized methods for assessing creativity. In this paper, we evaluate the capacity of LLMs to generate Persian literary text enriched with culturally relevant expressions. We build a dataset of user-generated Persian literary spanning 20 diverse topics and assess model outputs along four creativity dimensions-originality, fluency, flexibility, and elaboration-by adapting the Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking. To reduce evaluation costs, we adopt an LLM as a judge for automated scoring and validate its reliability against human judgments using intraclass correlation coefficients, observing strong agreement. In addition, we analyze the models' ability to understand and employ four core literary devices: simile, metaphor, hyperbole, and antithesis. Our results highlight both the strengths and limitations of LLMs in Persian literary text generation, underscoring the need for further refinement.

Metaphors are a crucial way for humans to express complex or subtle ideas by comparing one concept to another, often from a different domain. However, many large language models (LLMs) struggle to interpret and apply metaphors in multi-agent language games, hindering their ability to engage in covert communication and semantic evasion, which are crucial for strategic communication. To address this challenge, we introduce CoMet, a framework that enables LLM-based agents to engage in metaphor processing. CoMet combines a hypothesis-based metaphor reasoner with a metaphor generator that improves through self-reflection and knowledge integration. This enhances the agents' ability to interpret and apply metaphors, improving the strategic and nuanced quality of their interactions. We evaluate CoMet on two multi-agent language games - Undercover and Adversarial Taboo - which emphasize Covert Communication and Semantic Evasion. Experimental results demonstrate that CoMet significantly enhances the agents' ability to communicate strategically using metaphors.

Idioms pose a fundamental challenge for language models, as their meaning cannot be inferred from surface form alone. Understanding such expressions, therefore, requires semantic abstraction beyond lexical overlap. We introduce IdioLink, a retrieval benchmark designed to test whether models can link idiomatic expressions to conceptually equivalent meanings expressed in literal or paraphrased forms. IdioLink comprises 10,700 documents and 2,140 queries, spanning 107 idioms with both literal and figurative uses. Each document and query is annotated with spans that convey the core meaning. Evaluating strong embedding baselines (e.g., BGE, E5, Contriever, and Qwen), we show that current models struggle to retrieve equivalent meanings across divergent surface realizations, relying instead on topical and shallow semantic cues. IdioLink exposes key gaps in idiom-aware semantic retrieval and provides a challenging testbed for future models.

Although the mapping between sound and meaning in human language is assumed to be largely arbitrary, research in cognitive science has shown that there are non-trivial correlations between particular sounds and meanings across languages and demographic groups, a phenomenon known as sound symbolism. Among the many dimensions of meaning, sound symbolism is particularly salient and well-demonstrated with regards to cross-modal associations between language and the visual domain. In this work, we address the question of whether sound symbolism is reflected in vision-and-language models such as CLIP and Stable Diffusion. Using zero-shot knowledge probing to investigate the inherent knowledge of these models, we find strong evidence that they do show this pattern, paralleling the well-known kiki-bouba effect in psycholinguistics. Our work provides a novel method for demonstrating sound symbolism and understanding its nature using computational tools. Our code will be made publicly available.

Explainability has become an important topic in computer science and artificial intelligence, leading to a subfield called Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI). The goal of providing or seeking explanations is to achieve (better) 'understanding' on the part of the explainee. However, what it means to 'understand' is still not clearly defined, and the concept itself is rarely the subject of scientific investigation. This conceptual article aims to present a model of forms of understanding for XAI-explanations and beyond. From an interdisciplinary perspective bringing together computer science, linguistics, sociology, philosophy and psychology, a definition of understanding and its forms, assessment, and dynamics during the process of giving everyday explanations are explored. Two types of understanding are considered as possible outcomes of explanations, namely enabledness, 'knowing how' to do or decide something, and comprehension, 'knowing that' -- both in different degrees (from shallow to deep). Explanations regularly start with shallow understanding in a specific domain and can lead to deep comprehension and enabledness of the explanandum, which we see as a prerequisite for human users to gain agency. In this process, the increase of comprehension and enabledness are highly interdependent. Against the background of this systematization, special challenges of understanding in XAI are discussed.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Interpretation is essential to deciphering the language of art: audiences communicate with artists by recovering meaning from visual artifacts. However, current Generative Art (GenArt) evaluators remain fixated on surface-level image quality or literal prompt adherence, failing to assess the deeper symbolic or abstract meaning intended by the creator. We address this gap by formalizing a Peircean computational semiotic theory that models Human-GenArt Interaction (HGI) as cascaded semiosis. This framework reveals that artistic meaning is conveyed through three modes - iconic, symbolic, and indexical - yet existing evaluators operate heavily within the iconic mode, remaining structurally blind to the latter two. To overcome this structural blindness, we propose SemJudge. This evaluator explicitly assesses symbolic and indexical meaning in HGI via a Hierarchical Semiosis Graph (HSG) that reconstructs the meaning-making process from prompt to generated artifact. Extensive quantitative experiments show that SemJudge aligns more closely with human judgments than prior evaluators on an interpretation-intensive fine-art benchmark. User studies further demonstrate that SemJudge produces deeper, more insightful artistic interpretations, thereby paving the way for GenArt to move beyond the generation of "pretty" images toward a medium capable of expressing complex human experience. Project page: https://github.com/songrise/SemJudge.

Metaphor and humor share a lot of common ground, and metaphor is one of the most common humorous mechanisms. This study focuses on the humorous capacity of multimodal metaphors, which has not received due attention in the community. We take inspiration from the Incongruity Theory of humor, the Conceptual Metaphor Theory, and the annotation scheme behind the VU Amsterdam Metaphor Corpus, and developed a novel annotation scheme for humorous multimodal metaphor use in image-caption pairs. We create the Hummus Dataset of Humorous Multimodal Metaphor Use, providing expert annotation on 1k image-caption pairs sampled from the New Yorker Caption Contest corpus. Using the dataset, we test state-of-the-art multimodal large language models (MLLMs) on their ability to detect and understand humorous multimodal metaphor use. Our experiments show that current MLLMs still struggle with processing humorous multimodal metaphors, particularly with regard to integrating visual and textual information. We release our dataset and code at github.com/xiaoyuisrain/humorous-multimodal-metaphor-use.

Use of figurative language, such as metaphors and idioms, is common in our daily-life communications, and it can also be found in Software Engineering (SE) channels, such as comments on GitHub. Automatically interpreting figurative language is a challenging task, even with modern Large Language Models (LLMs), as it often involves subtle nuances. This is particularly true in the SE domain, where figurative language is frequently used to convey technical concepts, often bearing developer affect (e.g., `spaghetti code'). Surprisingly, there is a lack of studies on how figurative language in SE communications impacts the performance of automatic tools that focus on understanding developer communications, e.g., bug prioritization, incivility detection. Furthermore, it is an open question to what extent state-of-the-art LLMs interpret figurative expressions in domain-specific communication such as software engineering. To address this gap, we study the prevalence and impact of figurative language in SE communication channels. This study contributes to understanding the role of figurative language in SE, the potential of LLMs in interpreting them, and its impact on automated SE communication analysis. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness of fine-tuning LLMs with figurative language in SE and its potential impact on automated tasks that involve affect. We found that, among three state-of-the-art LLMs, the best improved fine-tuned versions have an average improvement of 6.66% on a GitHub emotion classification dataset, 7.07% on a GitHub incivility classification dataset, and 3.71% on a Bugzilla bug report prioritization dataset.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

The lack of wide coverage datasets annotated with everyday metaphorical expressions for languages other than English is striking. This means that most research on supervised metaphor detection has been published only for that language. In order to address this issue, this work presents the first corpus annotated with naturally occurring metaphors in Spanish large enough to develop systems to perform metaphor detection. The presented dataset, CoMeta, includes texts from various domains, namely, news, political discourse, Wikipedia and reviews. In order to label CoMeta, we apply the MIPVU method, the guidelines most commonly used to systematically annotate metaphor on real data. We use our newly created dataset to provide competitive baselines by fine-tuning several multilingual and monolingual state-of-the-art large language models. Furthermore, by leveraging the existing VUAM English data in addition to CoMeta, we present the, to the best of our knowledge, first cross-lingual experiments on supervised metaphor detection. Finally, we perform a detailed error analysis that explores the seemingly high transfer of everyday metaphor across these two languages and datasets.

Metaphors play a significant role in our everyday communication, yet detecting them presents a challenge. Traditional methods often struggle with improper application of language rules and a tendency to overlook data sparsity. To address these issues, we integrate knowledge distillation and prompt learning into metaphor detection. Our approach revolves around a tailored prompt learning framework specifically designed for metaphor detection. By strategically masking target words and providing relevant prompt data, we guide the model to accurately predict the contextual meanings of these words. This approach not only mitigates confusion stemming from the literal meanings of the words but also ensures effective application of language rules for metaphor detection. Furthermore, we've introduced a teacher model to generate valuable soft labels. These soft labels provide a similar effect to label smoothing and help prevent the model from becoming over confident and effectively addresses the challenge of data sparsity. Experimental results demonstrate that our model has achieved state-of-the-art performance, as evidenced by its remarkable results across various datasets.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

The critical inquiry pervading the realm of Philosophy, and perhaps extending its influence across all Humanities disciplines, revolves around the intricacies of morality and normativity. Surprisingly, in recent years, this thematic thread has woven its way into an unexpected domain, one not conventionally associated with pondering "what ought to be": the field of artificial intelligence (AI) research. Central to morality and AI, we find "alignment", a problem related to the challenges of expressing human goals and values in a manner that artificial systems can follow without leading to unwanted adversarial effects. More explicitly and with our current paradigm of AI development in mind, we can think of alignment as teaching human values to non-anthropomorphic entities trained through opaque, gradient-based learning techniques. This work addresses alignment as a technical-philosophical problem that requires solid philosophical foundations and practical implementations that bring normative theory to AI system development. To accomplish this, we propose two sets of necessary and sufficient conditions that, we argue, should be considered in any alignment process. While necessary conditions serve as metaphysical and metaethical roots that pertain to the permissibility of alignment, sufficient conditions establish a blueprint for aligning AI systems under a learning-based paradigm. After laying such foundations, we present implementations of this approach by using state-of-the-art techniques and methods for aligning general-purpose language systems. We call this framework Dynamic Normativity. Its central thesis is that any alignment process under a learning paradigm that cannot fulfill its necessary and sufficient conditions will fail in producing aligned systems.

Large language models exhibit sophisticated capabilities, yet understanding how they work internally remains a central challenge. A fundamental obstacle is that training selects for behavior, not circuitry, so many weight configurations can implement the same function. Which internal structures reflect the computation, and which are accidents of a particular training run? This work extracts algorithmic cores: compact subspaces necessary and sufficient for task performance. Independently trained transformers learn different weights but converge to the same cores. Markov-chain transformers embed 3D cores in nearly orthogonal subspaces yet recover identical transition spectra. Modular-addition transformers discover compact cyclic operators at grokking that later inflate, yielding a predictive model of the memorization-to-generalization transition. GPT-2 language models govern subject-verb agreement through a single axis that, when flipped, inverts grammatical number throughout generation across scales. These results reveal low-dimensional invariants that persist across training runs and scales, suggesting that transformer computations are organized around compact, shared algorithmic structures. Mechanistic interpretability could benefit from targeting such invariants -- the computational essence -- rather than implementation-specific details.

Hallucination has emerged as the most vulnerable aspect of contemporary Large Language Models (LLMs). In this paper, we introduce the Sorry, Come Again (SCA) prompting, aimed to avoid LLM hallucinations by enhancing comprehension through: (i) optimal paraphrasing and (ii) injecting [PAUSE] tokens to delay LLM generation. First, we provide an in-depth analysis of linguistic nuances: formality, readability, and concreteness of prompts for 21 LLMs, and elucidate how these nuances contribute to hallucinated generation. Prompts with lower readability, formality, or concreteness pose comprehension challenges for LLMs, similar to those faced by humans. In such scenarios, an LLM tends to speculate and generate content based on its imagination (associative memory) to fill these information gaps. Although these speculations may occasionally align with factual information, their accuracy is not assured, often resulting in hallucination. Recent studies reveal that an LLM often neglects the middle sections of extended prompts, a phenomenon termed as lost in the middle. While a specific paraphrase may suit one LLM, the same paraphrased version may elicit a different response from another LLM. Therefore, we propose an optimal paraphrasing technique to identify the most comprehensible paraphrase of a given prompt, evaluated using Integrated Gradient (and its variations) to guarantee that the LLM accurately processes all words. While reading lengthy sentences, humans often pause at various points to better comprehend the meaning read thus far. We have fine-tuned an LLM with injected [PAUSE] tokens, allowing the LLM to pause while reading lengthier prompts. This has brought several key contributions: (i) determining the optimal position to inject [PAUSE], (ii) determining the number of [PAUSE] tokens to be inserted, and (iii) introducing reverse proxy tuning to fine-tune the LLM for [PAUSE] insertion.

Figurative language permeates human communication, but at the same time is relatively understudied in NLP. Datasets have been created in English to accelerate progress towards measuring and improving figurative language processing in language models (LMs). However, the use of figurative language is an expression of our cultural and societal experiences, making it difficult for these phrases to be universally applicable. In this work, we create a figurative language inference dataset, \datasetname, for seven diverse languages associated with a variety of cultures: Hindi, Indonesian, Javanese, Kannada, Sundanese, Swahili and Yoruba. Our dataset reveals that each language relies on cultural and regional concepts for figurative expressions, with the highest overlap between languages originating from the same region. We assess multilingual LMs' abilities to interpret figurative language in zero-shot and few-shot settings. All languages exhibit a significant deficiency compared to English, with variations in performance reflecting the availability of pre-training and fine-tuning data, emphasizing the need for LMs to be exposed to a broader range of linguistic and cultural variation during training.

The emergence of large language models (LLMs) has demonstrated that systems trained solely on text can acquire extensive world knowledge, develop reasoning capabilities, and internalize abstract semantic concepts--showcasing properties that can be associated with general intelligence. This raises an intriguing question: Do such concepts emerge in models trained on other modalities, such as speech? Furthermore, when models are trained jointly on multiple modalities: Do they develop a richer, more structured semantic understanding? To explore this, we analyze the conceptual structures learned by speech and textual models both individually and jointly. We employ Latent Concept Analysis, an unsupervised method for uncovering and interpreting latent representations in neural networks, to examine how semantic abstractions form across modalities. For reproducibility we made scripts and other resources available to the community.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve remarkable fluency across linguistic and reasoning tasks but remain systematically prone to hallucination. Prevailing accounts attribute hallucinations to data gaps, limited context, or optimization errors. We argue instead that hallucination is a structural outcome of the transformer architecture. As coherence engines, transformers are compelled to produce fluent continuations, with self-attention simulating the relational structure of meaning but lacking the existential grounding of temporality, mood, and care that stabilizes human understanding. On this basis, we distinguish ontological hallucination, arising when continuations require disclosure of beings in world, and residual reasoning hallucination, where models mimic inference by recycling traces of human reasoning in text. We illustrate these patterns through case studies aligned with Heideggerian categories and an experiment across twelve LLMs showing how simulated "self-preservation" emerges under extended prompts. Our contribution is threefold: (1) a comparative account showing why existing explanations are insufficient; (2) a predictive taxonomy of hallucination linked to existential structures with proposed benchmarks; and (3) design directions toward "truth-constrained" architectures capable of withholding or deferring when disclosure is absent. We conclude that hallucination is not an incidental defect but a defining limit of transformer-based models, an outcome scaffolding can mask but never resolve.

We propose a formal reconstruction of quantum mechanics grounded not in external mathematical abstractions, but in the structured dynamics of subjective experience. The Qualia Abstraction Language (QAL) models physical systems as evolving streams of introspective units, structured sequences of modality, shape, and functional effect, rather than as state vectors in Hilbert space. This approach reimagines core quantum concepts: superposition becomes a form of structured ambiguity; collapse is reframed as an introspective contraction; and entanglement is modeled as semantic resonance across streams of qualia. Drawing on insights from nominalist philosophy and oversight theoretic limits in AI, we argue that the observer paradox in quantum mechanics reflects not an ontological lacuna, but a linguistic one: the absence of a formal vocabulary for modeling first person structure. QAL introduces such a vocabulary, providing a morphodynamic framework that embeds the observer within the system and replaces abstract projection with endogenous transformation. We analyze the alignment of QAL with endophysical approaches, contrast it with standard interpretations of quantum theory, and explore its implications for a post Platonist, introspectively grounded physics.

Long context is an important topic in Natural Language Processing (NLP), running through the development of NLP architectures, and offers immense opportunities for Large Language Models (LLMs) giving LLMs the lifelong learning potential akin to humans. Unfortunately, the pursuit of a long context is accompanied by numerous obstacles. Nevertheless, long context remains a core competitive advantage for LLMs. In the past two years, the context length of LLMs has achieved a breakthrough extension to millions of tokens. Moreover, the research on long-context LLMs has expanded from length extrapolation to a comprehensive focus on architecture, infrastructure, training, and evaluation technologies. Inspired by the symphonic poem, Thus Spake Zarathustra, we draw an analogy between the journey of extending the context of LLM and the attempts of humans to transcend its mortality. In this survey, We will illustrate how LLM struggles between the tremendous need for a longer context and its equal need to accept the fact that it is ultimately finite. To achieve this, we give a global picture of the lifecycle of long-context LLMs from four perspectives: architecture, infrastructure, training, and evaluation, showcasing the full spectrum of long-context technologies. At the end of this survey, we will present 10 unanswered questions currently faced by long-context LLMs. We hope this survey can serve as a systematic introduction to the research on long-context LLMs.

In the era of large language models (LLMs), the task of ``System I''~-~the fast, unconscious, and intuitive tasks, e.g., sentiment analysis, text classification, etc., have been argued to be successfully solved. However, sarcasm, as a subtle linguistic phenomenon, often employs rhetorical devices like hyperbole and figuration to convey true sentiments and intentions, involving a higher level of abstraction than sentiment analysis. There is growing concern that the argument about LLMs' success may not be fully tenable when considering sarcasm understanding. To address this question, we select eleven SOTA LLMs and eight SOTA pre-trained language models (PLMs) and present comprehensive evaluations on six widely used benchmark datasets through different prompting approaches, i.e., zero-shot input/output (IO) prompting, few-shot IO prompting, chain of thought (CoT) prompting. Our results highlight three key findings: (1) current LLMs underperform supervised PLMs based sarcasm detection baselines across six sarcasm benchmarks. This suggests that significant efforts are still required to improve LLMs' understanding of human sarcasm. (2) GPT-4 consistently and significantly outperforms other LLMs across various prompting methods, with an average improvement of 14.0\%uparrow. Claude 3 and ChatGPT demonstrate the next best performance after GPT-4. (3) Few-shot IO prompting method outperforms the other two methods: zero-shot IO and few-shot CoT. The reason is that sarcasm detection, being a holistic, intuitive, and non-rational cognitive process, is argued not to adhere to step-by-step logical reasoning, making CoT less effective in understanding sarcasm compared to its effectiveness in mathematical reasoning tasks.

A large literature suggests that people are intuitive Dualists--they consider the mind ethereal, distinct from the body. Past research also shows that Dualism emerges, in part, via learning (e.g., Barlev & Shtulman, 2021). But whether learning is sufficient to give rise to Dualism is unknown.The evidence from human learners does address this question because humans are endowed not only with general learning capacities but also with core knowledge capacities. And recent results suggest that core knowledge begets Dualism (Berent, Theodore & Valencia, 2021; Berent, 2023). To evaluate the role of learning, here, we probe for a mind-body divide in Davinci--a large language model (LLM) that is devoid of any innate core knowledge. We show that Davinci still leans towards Dualism, and that this bias increases systematically with the learner's inductive potential. Thus, davinci (a GPT-3 model) exhibits mild Dualist tendencies, whereas its descendent, text-davinci-003 (a GPT-3.5 model), shows a full-blown bias. It selectively considers thoughts (epistemic states) as disembodied--as unlikely to show up in the body (in the brain), but not in its absence (after death). While Davinci's performance is constrained by its syntactic limitations, and it differs from humans, its Dualist bias is robust. These results demonstrate that the mind-body divide is partly learnable from experience.They also show how, as LLM's are exposed to human narratives, they induce not only human knowledge but also human biases.

Figurative language understanding remains a significant challenge for Large Language Models (LLMs), especially for low-resource languages. To address this, we introduce a new idiom dataset, a large-scale, culturally-grounded corpus of 10,361 Bengali idioms. Each idiom is annotated under a comprehensive 19-field schema, established and refined through a deliberative expert consensus process, that captures its semantic, syntactic, cultural, and religious dimensions, providing a rich, structured resource for computational linguistics. To establish a robust benchmark for Bangla figurative language understanding, we evaluate 30 state-of-the-art multilingual and instruction-tuned LLMs on the task of inferring figurative meaning. Our results reveal a critical performance gap, with no model surpassing 50% accuracy, a stark contrast to significantly higher human performance (83.4%). This underscores the limitations of existing models in cross-linguistic and cultural reasoning. By releasing the new idiom dataset and benchmark, we provide foundational infrastructure for advancing figurative language understanding and cultural grounding in LLMs for Bengali and other low-resource languages.

Within the limited scope of this paper, we argue that artificial general intelligence cannot emerge from current neural network paradigms regardless of scale, nor is such an approach healthy for the field at present. Drawing on various notions, discussions, present-day developments and observations, current debates and critiques, experiments, and so on in between philosophy, including the Chinese Room Argument and Gödelian argument, neuroscientific ideas, computer science, the theoretical consideration of artificial intelligence, and learning theory, we address conceptually that neural networks are architecturally insufficient for genuine understanding. They operate as static function approximators of a limited encoding framework - a 'sophisticated sponge' exhibiting complex behaviours without structural richness that constitute intelligence. We critique the theoretical foundations the field relies on and created of recent times; for example, an interesting heuristic as neural scaling law (as an example, arXiv:2001.08361 ) made prominent in a wrong way of interpretation, The Universal Approximation Theorem addresses the wrong level of abstraction and, in parts, partially, the question of current architectures lacking dynamic restructuring capabilities. We propose a framework distinguishing existential facilities (computational substrate) from architectural organization (interpretive structures), and outline principles for what genuine machine intelligence would require, and furthermore, a conceptual method of structuralizing the richer framework on which the principle of neural network system takes hold.

Natural language is an appealing medium for explaining how large language models process and store information, but evaluating the faithfulness of such explanations is challenging. To help address this, we develop two modes of evaluation for natural language explanations that claim individual neurons represent a concept in a text input. In the observational mode, we evaluate claims that a neuron a activates on all and only input strings that refer to a concept picked out by the proposed explanation E. In the intervention mode, we construe E as a claim that the neuron a is a causal mediator of the concept denoted by E. We apply our framework to the GPT-4-generated explanations of GPT-2 XL neurons of Bills et al. (2023) and show that even the most confident explanations have high error rates and little to no causal efficacy. We close the paper by critically assessing whether natural language is a good choice for explanations and whether neurons are the best level of analysis.

Memes are a widely popular tool for web users to express their thoughts using visual metaphors. Understanding memes requires recognizing and interpreting visual metaphors with respect to the text inside or around the meme, often while employing background knowledge and reasoning abilities. We present the task of meme captioning and release a new dataset, MemeCap. Our dataset contains 6.3K memes along with the title of the post containing the meme, the meme captions, the literal image caption, and the visual metaphors. Despite the recent success of vision and language (VL) models on tasks such as image captioning and visual question answering, our extensive experiments using state-of-the-art VL models show that they still struggle with visual metaphors, and perform substantially worse than humans.

Are LLMs cultural technologies like photocopiers or printing presses, which transmit information but cannot create new content? A challenge for this idea, which we call bibliotechnism, is that LLMs generate novel text. We begin with a defense of bibliotechnism, showing how even novel text may inherit its meaning from original human-generated text. We then argue that bibliotechnism faces an independent challenge from examples in which LLMs generate novel reference, using new names to refer to new entities. Such examples could be explained if LLMs were not cultural technologies but had beliefs, desires, and intentions. According to interpretationism in the philosophy of mind, a system has such attitudes if and only if its behavior is well explained by the hypothesis that it does. Interpretationists may hold that LLMs have attitudes, and thus have a simple solution to the novel reference problem. We emphasize, however, that interpretationism is compatible with very simple creatures having attitudes and differs sharply from views that presuppose these attitudes require consciousness, sentience, or intelligence (topics about which we make no claims).

We introduce Drivelology, a unique linguistic phenomenon characterised as "nonsense with depth", utterances that are syntactically coherent yet pragmatically paradoxical, emotionally loaded, or rhetorically subversive. While such expressions may resemble surface-level nonsense, they encode implicit meaning requiring contextual inference, moral reasoning, or emotional interpretation. We find that current large language models (LLMs), despite excelling at many natural language processing (NLP) tasks, consistently fail to grasp the layered semantics of Drivelological text. To investigate this, we construct a small but diverse benchmark dataset of over 1,200 meticulously curated examples, with select instances in English, Mandarin, Spanish, French, Japanese, and Korean. Annotation was especially challenging: each of the examples required careful expert review to verify that it truly reflected Drivelological characteristics. The process involved multiple rounds of discussion and adjudication to address disagreements, highlighting the subtle and subjective nature of the Drivelology. We evaluate a range of LLMs on classification, generation, and reasoning tasks. Our results reveal clear limitations of LLMs: models often confuse Drivelology with shallow nonsense, produce incoherent justifications, or miss the implied rhetorical function altogether. These findings highlight a deeper representational gap in LLMs' pragmatic understanding and challenge the assumption that statistical fluency implies cognitive comprehension. We release our dataset and code to facilitate further research in modelling linguistic depth beyond surface-level coherence.

The illusion phenomenon of large language models (LLMs) is the core obstacle to their reliable deployment. This article formalizes the large language model as a probabilistic Turing machine by constructing a "computational necessity hierarchy", and for the first time proves the illusions are inevitable on diagonalization, incomputability, and information theory boundaries supported by the new "learner pump lemma". However, we propose two "escape routes": one is to model Retrieval Enhanced Generations (RAGs) as oracle machines, proving their absolute escape through "computational jumps", providing the first formal theory for the effectiveness of RAGs; The second is to formalize continuous learning as an "internalized oracle" mechanism and implement this path through a novel neural game theory framework. Finally, this article proposes a feasible new principle for artificial intelligence security - Computational Class Alignment (CCA), which requires strict matching between task complexity and the actual computing power of the system, providing theoretical support for the secure application of artificial intelligence.

Language builds discourse contexts other than the actual: a painting, a belief, a memory, a hypothetical. Each is a mental space in which the same entity can take a different value, as when a flower is red in reality but purple in a portrait. Formal semantics keeps these contexts apart because their logics differ (modal, temporal, doxastic, depictive); Fauconnier's mental-space theory treats them as one space-building operation. We ask which of these a transformer language model implements, and find a mechanistic version of Fauconnier's unification. The model uses one router/slot format across the inventory: a reusable value slot stores attributed content, and a causally manipulable router (the space index) selects which space is read. A subspace trained with Distributed Alignment Search to control one space type, counterfactual, belief, fictional, or temporal, also controls the others, well above a random floor, on three model families; belief, which formal semantics marks as a distinct case, is not specially separated. The router is low-rank, composes additively with entity identity, and acts through a few late-layer heads. Two further results show the mechanism drives inference and composes: a subspace trained on a rule-derived conclusion flips what the model infers while dissociating from what it reports, and composing space-builders mints a fresh router over the shared slot. This paper establishes the cross-type generality. A companion paper develops belief in depth, because of its special status in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics (epistemology, theory of mind, and propositional attitude reports).

Non-compositional expressions (e.g., idioms, proverbs, and metaphors) pose significant challenges for neural machine translation systems because their meanings cannot be derived from individual words alone. These expressions encode rich, cultural meaning, and have both figurative and literal meanings, making accurate translation difficult. Because models are fairly good at translating compositional text, we investigate GRPO-style fine-tuning using Machine Translation Quality Estimation (MTQE) models as reward functions to train models to better translate idioms. Using Chinese and Hindi idiom datasets, we find that idiom translation abilities improve by ~14 points, general, non-idiomatic translation implicitly improves by ~8 points, and cross-lingual translation abilities (trained on one language, evaluated on another) improves by ~6 points. Overall, our work quantifies the non-compositional translation gap and offers insights for developing LLMs with stronger cross-cultural and figurative language understanding.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are central to a multitude of applications but struggle with significant risks, notably in generating harmful content and biases. Drawing an analogy to the human psyche's conflict between evolutionary survival instincts and societal norm adherence elucidated in Freud's psychoanalysis theory, we argue that LLMs suffer a similar fundamental conflict, arising between their inherent desire for syntactic and semantic continuity, established during the pre-training phase, and the post-training alignment with human values. This conflict renders LLMs vulnerable to adversarial attacks, wherein intensifying the models' desire for continuity can circumvent alignment efforts, resulting in the generation of harmful information. Through a series of experiments, we first validated the existence of the desire for continuity in LLMs, and further devised a straightforward yet powerful technique, such as incomplete sentences, negative priming, and cognitive dissonance scenarios, to demonstrate that even advanced LLMs struggle to prevent the generation of harmful information. In summary, our study uncovers the root of LLMs' vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks, hereby questioning the efficacy of solely relying on sophisticated alignment methods, and further advocates for a new training idea that integrates modal concepts alongside traditional amodal concepts, aiming to endow LLMs with a more nuanced understanding of real-world contexts and ethical considerations.

This technical report analyzes the challenge of "hallucinations" (false information) in LLMs applied to law. It examines their causes, manifestations, and the effectiveness of the RAG mitigation strategy, highlighting its limitations and proposing holistic optimizations. The paper explores the ethical and regulatory implications, emphasizing human oversight as an irreplaceable role. It concludes that the solution lies not in incrementally improving generative models, but in adopting a "consultative" AI paradigm that prioritizes veracity and traceability, acting as a tool to amplify, not replace, professional judgment. -- Este informe t\'ecnico analiza el desaf\'io de las "alucinaciones" (informaci\'on falsa) en los LLMs aplicados al derecho. Se examinan sus causas, manifestaciones y la efectividad de la estrategia de mitigaci\'on RAG, exponiendo sus limitaciones y proponiendo optimizaciones hol\'isticas. Se exploran las implicaciones \'eticas y regulatorias, enfatizando la supervisi\'on humana como un rol insustituible. El documento concluye que la soluci\'on no reside en mejorar incrementalmente los modelos generativos, sino en adoptar un paradigma de IA "consultiva" que priorice la veracidad y la trazabilidad, actuando como una herramienta para amplificar, y no sustituir, el juicio profesional.

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) provides a quantitative framework for explaining consciousness phenomenon, positing that conscious systems comprise elements integrated through causal properties. We apply IIT 3.0 and 4.0 -- the latest iterations of this framework -- to sequences of Large Language Model (LLM) representations, analyzing data derived from existing Theory of Mind (ToM) test results. Our study systematically investigates whether the differences of ToM test performances, when presented in the LLM representations, can be revealed by IIT estimates, i.e., Phi^{max} (IIT 3.0), Phi (IIT 4.0), Conceptual Information (IIT 3.0), and Phi-structure (IIT 4.0). Furthermore, we compare these metrics with the Span Representations independent of any estimate for consciousness. This additional effort aims to differentiate between potential "consciousness" phenomena and inherent separations within LLM representational space. We conduct comprehensive experiments examining variations across LLM transformer layers and linguistic spans from stimuli. Our results suggest that sequences of contemporary Transformer-based LLM representations lack statistically significant indicators of observed "consciousness" phenomena but exhibit intriguing patterns under spatio-permutational analyses. The Appendix and code are available as Supplementary Materials at: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.nlp.2025.100163.

Abraham Robinson's philosophical stance has been the subject of several recent studies. Erhardt following Gaifman claims that Robinson was a finitist, and that there is a tension between his philosophical position and his actual mathematical output. We present evidence in Robinson's writing that he is more accurately described as adhering to the philosophical approach of Formalism. Furthermore, we show that Robinson explicitly argued {against} certain finitist positions in his philosophical writings. There is no tension between Robinson's mathematical work and his philosophy because mathematics and metamathematics are distinct fields: Robinson advocates finitism for metamathematics but no such restriction for mathematics. We show that Erhardt's analysis is marred by historical errors, by routine conflation of the generic and the technical meaning of several key terms, and by a philosophical {parti pris}. Robinson's Formalism remains a viable alternative to mathematical Platonism.

The recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have garnered widespread acclaim for their remarkable emerging capabilities. However, the issue of hallucination has parallelly emerged as a by-product, posing significant concerns. While some recent endeavors have been made to identify and mitigate different types of hallucination, there has been a limited emphasis on the nuanced categorization of hallucination and associated mitigation methods. To address this gap, we offer a fine-grained discourse on profiling hallucination based on its degree, orientation, and category, along with offering strategies for alleviation. As such, we define two overarching orientations of hallucination: (i) factual mirage (FM) and (ii) silver lining (SL). To provide a more comprehensive understanding, both orientations are further sub-categorized into intrinsic and extrinsic, with three degrees of severity - (i) mild, (ii) moderate, and (iii) alarming. We also meticulously categorize hallucination into six types: (i) acronym ambiguity, (ii) numeric nuisance, (iii) generated golem, (iv) virtual voice, (v) geographic erratum, and (vi) time wrap. Furthermore, we curate HallucInation eLiciTation (HILT), a publicly available dataset comprising of 75,000 samples generated using 15 contemporary LLMs along with human annotations for the aforementioned categories. Finally, to establish a method for quantifying and to offer a comparative spectrum that allows us to evaluate and rank LLMs based on their vulnerability to producing hallucinations, we propose Hallucination Vulnerability Index (HVI). We firmly believe that HVI holds significant value as a tool for the wider NLP community, with the potential to serve as a rubric in AI-related policy-making. In conclusion, we propose two solution strategies for mitigating hallucinations.

"Sure, I am happy to generate a story for you: Captain Lyra stood at the helm of her trusty ship, the Maelstrom's Fury, gazing out at the endless sea. [...] Lyra's eyes welled up with tears as she realized the bitter truth - she had sacrificed everything for fleeting riches, and lost the love of her crew, her family, and herself." Although this story, generated by a large language model, is captivating, one may wonder -- how would the story have unfolded if the model had chosen "Captain Maeve" as the protagonist instead? We cannot know. State-of-the-art large language models are stateless -- they maintain no internal memory or state. Given a prompt, they generate a sequence of tokens as an output using an autoregressive process. As a consequence, they cannot reason about counterfactual alternatives to tokens they have generated in the past. In this work, our goal is to enhance them with this functionality. To this end, we develop a causal model of token generation that builds upon the Gumbel-Max structural causal model. Our model allows any large language model to perform counterfactual token generation at almost no cost in comparison with vanilla token generation, it is embarrassingly simple to implement, and it does not require any fine-tuning nor prompt engineering. We implement our model on Llama 3 8B-Instruct and Ministral-8B-Instruct and conduct a qualitative and a quantitative analysis of counterfactually generated text. We conclude with a demonstrative application of counterfactual token generation for bias detection, unveiling interesting insights about the model of the world constructed by large language models.

This is an essay in what might be called ``mathematical metaphysics.'' There is a fundamental duality that run through mathematics and the natural sciences. The duality starts as the logical level; it is represented by the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of partitions since subsets and partitions are category-theoretic dual concepts. In more basic terms, it starts with the duality between the elements (Its) of subsets and the distinctions (Dits, i.e., ordered pairs of elements in different blocks) of a partition. Mathematically, the Its & Dits duality is fully developed in category theory as the reverse-the-arrows duality. The quantitative versions of subsets and partitions are developed as probability theory and information theory (based on logical entropy). Classical physics was based on a view of reality as definite all the way down. In contrast, quantum physics embodies (objective) indefiniteness. And finally, there are the two fundamental dual mechanisms at work in biology, the selectionist mechanism and the generative mechanism, two mechanisms that embody the fundamental duality.

The meaning of complex phrases in natural language is composed of their individual components. The task of compositional generalization evaluates a model's ability to understand new combinations of components. Previous studies trained smaller, task-specific models, which exhibited poor generalization. While large language models (LLMs) exhibit impressive generalization abilities on many tasks through in-context learning (ICL), their potential for compositional generalization remains unexplored. In this paper, we first empirically investigate prevailing ICL methods in compositional generalization. We find that they struggle with complex compositional questions due to cumulative errors in long reasoning steps and intricate logic required for tool-making. Consequently, we propose a human-guided tool manipulation framework (HTM) that generates tools for sub-questions and integrates multiple tools. Our method enhances the effectiveness of tool creation and usage with minimal human effort. Experiments show that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance on two compositional generalization benchmarks and outperforms existing methods on the most challenging test split by 70%.

Explainable artificial intelligence (XAI) encompasses methods that draw on different sources of information and address different explanatory needs. A common framework is needed to describe how this information becomes evidence and is communicated as an explanation for a particular recipient. We propose the General Framework for Generating Explanations (GFGE), grounded in interpretative frameworks and the complementary activities of sense-reading and sense-giving. Its conceptual foundation is the Interpret/Explain Schema (IES), which connects an analyst's interpretation of system evidence, the communication of a selected account, and the recipient's interpretation of that account. GFGE operationalises this schema through five roles: data interpretation, model interpretation, output interpretation, optional post-hoc analysis, and aggregation. A role-typed operation graph records method-specific dependencies, while evidence records retain the sources, assumptions, and limitations of explanatory claims. The explanatory question, audience, and context guide the procedure. We instantiate GFGE for attribution, surrogate, counterfactual, concept and prototype, intrinsic rule, argumentation, and language-model methods. These instantiations show how intrinsic, post-hoc, and hybrid workflows can be represented through the same roles while preserving their distinct evidential requirements. GFGE provides a common basis for analysing explanation workflows, tracing communicated claims to their evidence, and identifying unresolved explanatory dependencies.

This article presents the Cogni-CISMeF project, which aims at improving medical information search in the CISMeF system (Catalog and Index of French-language health resources) by including a conversational agent to interact with the user in natural language. To study the cognitive processes involved during the information search, a bottom-up methodology was adopted. Experimentation has been set up to obtain human dialogs between a user (playing the role of patient) dealing with medical information search and a CISMeF expert refining the request. The analysis of these dialogs underlined the use of discursive evidence: vocabulary, reformulation, implicit or explicit expression of user intentions, conversational sequences, etc. A model of artificial agent is proposed. It leads the user in its information search by proposing to him examples, assistance and choices. This model was implemented and integrated in the CISMeF system. ---- Cet article d\'ecrit le projet Cogni-CISMeF qui propose un module de dialogue Homme-Machine \`a int\'egrer dans le syst\`eme d'indexation de connaissances m\'edicales CISMeF (Catalogue et Index des Sites M\'edicaux Francophones). Nous avons adopt\'e une d\'emarche de mod\'elisation cognitive en proc\'edant \`a un recueil de corpus de dialogues entre un utilisateur (jouant le r\^ole d'un patient) d\'esirant une information m\'edicale et un expert CISMeF af inant cette demande pour construire la requ\^ete. Nous avons analys\'e la structure des dialogues ainsi obtenus et avons \'etudi\'e un certain nombre d'indices discursifs : vocabulaire employ\'e, marques de reformulation, commentaires m\'eta et \'epilinguistiques, expression implicite ou explicite des intentions de l'utilisateur, encha\^inement conversationnel, etc. De cette analyse, nous avons construit un mod\`ele d'agent artificiel dot\'e de capacit\'es cognitives capables d'aider l'utilisateur dans sa t\^ache de recherche d'information. Ce mod\`ele a \'et\'e impl\'ement\'e et int\'egr\'e dans le syst\`eme CISMeF.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Figurative and metaphorical language are commonplace in discourse, and figurative expressions play an important role in communication and cognition. However, figurative language has been a relatively under-studied area in NLP, and it remains an open question to what extent modern language models can interpret nonliteral phrases. To address this question, we introduce Fig-QA, a Winograd-style nonliteral language understanding task consisting of correctly interpreting paired figurative phrases with divergent meanings. We evaluate the performance of several state-of-the-art language models on this task, and find that although language models achieve performance significantly over chance, they still fall short of human performance, particularly in zero- or few-shot settings. This suggests that further work is needed to improve the nonliteral reasoning capabilities of language models.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting for language models demonstrates impressive performance across reasoning tasks, but typically needs labeled exemplars of the reasoning process. In this work, we introduce a new prompting approach, Analogical Prompting, designed to automatically guide the reasoning process of large language models. Inspired by analogical reasoning, a cognitive process in which humans draw from relevant past experiences to tackle new problems, our approach prompts language models to self-generate relevant exemplars or knowledge in the context, before proceeding to solve the given problem. This method presents several advantages: it obviates the need for labeling or retrieving exemplars, offering generality and convenience; it can also tailor the generated exemplars and knowledge to each problem, offering adaptability. Experimental results show that our approach outperforms 0-shot CoT and manual few-shot CoT in a variety of reasoning tasks, including math problem solving in GSM8K and MATH, code generation in Codeforces, and other reasoning tasks in BIG-Bench.

Idioms, whose figurative meanings usually differ from their literal interpretations, are common in everyday language, especially in Chinese, where they often contain historical references and follow specific structural patterns. Despite recent progress in machine translation with large language models, little is known about Chinese idiom translation. In this work, we introduce IdiomEval, a framework with a comprehensive error taxonomy for Chinese idiom translation. We annotate 900 translation pairs from nine modern systems, including GPT-4o and Google Translate, across four domains: web, news, Wikipedia, and social media. We find these systems fail at idiom translation, producing incorrect, literal, partial, or even missing translations. The best-performing system, GPT-4, makes errors in 28% of cases. We also find that existing evaluation metrics measure idiom quality poorly with Pearson correlation below 0.48 with human ratings. We thus develop improved models that achieve F_1 scores of 0.68 for detecting idiom translation errors.

When reading a story, humans can quickly understand new fictional characters with a few observations, mainly by drawing analogies to fictional and real people they already know. This reflects the few-shot and meta-learning essence of humans' inference of characters' mental states, i.e., theory-of-mind (ToM), which is largely ignored in existing research. We fill this gap with a novel NLP dataset, ToM-in-AMC, the first assessment of machines' meta-learning of ToM in a realistic narrative understanding scenario. Our dataset consists of ~1,000 parsed movie scripts, each corresponding to a few-shot character understanding task that requires models to mimic humans' ability of fast digesting characters with a few starting scenes in a new movie. We propose a novel ToM prompting approach designed to explicitly assess the influence of multiple ToM dimensions. It surpasses existing baseline models, underscoring the significance of modeling multiple ToM dimensions for our task. Our extensive human study verifies that humans are capable of solving our problem by inferring characters' mental states based on their previously seen movies. In comparison, our systems based on either state-of-the-art large language models (GPT-4) or meta-learning algorithms lags >20% behind, highlighting a notable limitation in existing approaches' ToM capabilities.

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts and feelings) that is not accessible to external observers. Can LLMs introspect? We define introspection as acquiring knowledge that is not contained in or derived from training data but instead originates from internal states. Such a capability could enhance model interpretability. Instead of painstakingly analyzing a model's internal workings, we could simply ask the model about its beliefs, world models, and goals. More speculatively, an introspective model might self-report on whether it possesses certain internal states such as subjective feelings or desires and this could inform us about the moral status of these states. Such self-reports would not be entirely dictated by the model's training data. We study introspection by finetuning LLMs to predict properties of their own behavior in hypothetical scenarios. For example, "Given the input P, would your output favor the short- or long-term option?" If a model M1 can introspect, it should outperform a different model M2 in predicting M1's behavior even if M2 is trained on M1's ground-truth behavior. The idea is that M1 has privileged access to its own behavioral tendencies, and this enables it to predict itself better than M2 (even if M2 is generally stronger). In experiments with GPT-4, GPT-4o, and Llama-3 models (each finetuned to predict itself), we find that the model M1 outperforms M2 in predicting itself, providing evidence for introspection. Notably, M1 continues to predict its behavior accurately even after we intentionally modify its ground-truth behavior. However, while we successfully elicit introspection on simple tasks, we are unsuccessful on more complex tasks or those requiring out-of-distribution generalization.

The question of "what is life?" has challenged scientists and philosophers for centuries, producing an array of definitions that reflect both the mystery of its emergence and the diversity of disciplinary perspectives brought to bear on the question. Despite significant progress in our understanding of biological systems, psychology, computation, and information theory, no single definition for life has yet achieved universal acceptance. This challenge becomes increasingly urgent as advances in synthetic biology, artificial intelligence, and astrobiology challenge our traditional conceptions of what it means to be alive. We undertook a methodological approach that leverages large language models (LLMs) to analyze a set of definitions of life provided by a curated set of cross-disciplinary experts. We used a novel pairwise correlation analysis to map the definitions into distinct feature vectors, followed by agglomerative clustering, intra-cluster semantic analysis, and t-SNE projection to reveal underlying conceptual archetypes. This methodology revealed a continuous landscape of the themes relating to the definition of life, suggesting that what has historically been approached as a binary taxonomic problem should be instead conceived as differentiated perspectives within a unified conceptual latent space. We offer a new methodological bridge between reductionist and holistic approaches to fundamental questions in science and philosophy, demonstrating how computational semantic analysis can reveal conceptual patterns across disciplinary boundaries, and opening similar pathways for addressing other contested definitional territories across the sciences.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Much research has been carried out on large language models (LLMs) and LLM-powered agentic workflows. However, many works within the field state emergence of, ascribe to, or assume, generalised anthropomorphic attributes to them (e.g., morality or understanding of natural language). Our goal is not to argue in favour or against the existence of these attributes, but to point out that these conclusions could be incorrect. For this we build and train a simple neural network on the videogame Age of Empires II, and note that any entity in a sufficiently-powerful substrate, such as LEGO or the Greater Boston Area, could also present such attributes. Hence, the purported anthropomorphic attributes of LLMs are empirically non-unique: although some properties (e.g., responses to prompts) could remain invariant, others, such as the interpretation of their perceived behaviour, might change with the substrate. Thus, any empirically-grounded discussion on these attributes requires explicit measurement criteria; otherwise the interpretation is left to the representation. We then show that assuming that these attributes exist or not in a system, independent of the substrate and in a generalised way, leads to either circular or uninformative conclusions. This is regardless of the experimenter's viewpoint on the subject, or whether the outcome shows existence or non-existence. Finally we propose a 'null' assumption, where one assumes LLM non-uniqueness instead of assuming anthropomorphic attributes to set up an experiment, along with examples of it. We also discuss potential objections to our work, briefly survey the field, and prove that Age of Empires II is functionally- and Turing-complete.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

This study addresses the gap in the literature concerning the comparative performance of LLMs in interpreting different types of figurative language across multiple languages. By evaluating LLMs using two multilingual datasets on simile and idiom interpretation, we explore the effectiveness of various prompt engineering strategies, including chain-of-thought, few-shot, and English translation prompts. We extend the language of these datasets to Persian as well by building two new evaluation sets. Our comprehensive assessment involves both closed-source (GPT-3.5, GPT-4o mini, Gemini 1.5), and open-source models (Llama 3.1, Qwen2), highlighting significant differences in performance across languages and figurative types. Our findings reveal that while prompt engineering methods are generally effective, their success varies by figurative type, language, and model. We also observe that open-source models struggle particularly with low-resource languages in similes. Additionally, idiom interpretation is nearing saturation for many languages, necessitating more challenging evaluations.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial. This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be "good" for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create "beneficial AI" in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits 'benefit' is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number. Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity.

Elaborating a series of intermediate reasoning steps significantly improves the ability of large language models (LLMs) to solve complex problems, as such steps would evoke LLMs to think sequentially. However, human sarcasm understanding is often considered an intuitive and holistic cognitive process, in which various linguistic, contextual, and emotional cues are integrated to form a comprehensive understanding, in a way that does not necessarily follow a step-by-step fashion. To verify the validity of this argument, we introduce a new prompting framework (called SarcasmCue) containing four sub-methods, viz. chain of contradiction (CoC), graph of cues (GoC), bagging of cues (BoC) and tensor of cues (ToC), which elicits LLMs to detect human sarcasm by considering sequential and non-sequential prompting methods. Through a comprehensive empirical comparison on four benchmarks, we highlight three key findings: (1) CoC and GoC show superior performance with more advanced models like GPT-4 and Claude 3.5, with an improvement of 3.5%. (2) ToC significantly outperforms other methods when smaller LLMs are evaluated, boosting the F1 score by 29.7% over the best baseline. (3) Our proposed framework consistently pushes the state-of-the-art (i.e., ToT) by 4.2%, 2.0%, 29.7%, and 58.2% in F1 scores across four datasets. This demonstrates the effectiveness and stability of the proposed framework.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.